An investigation by German public broadcasters WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung found that a Cypriot company allegedly supplied Western underwater surveillance technology worth about $50 million to Russian military intelligence.
According to the report, Russian businessmen for years used the Cypriot firm and other companies to purchase Western equipment for underwater surveillance. Documents show that some of the goods were delivered to Russia through circuitous routes and were used to create an Arctic surveillance system, code-named Harmony, designed to detect Western submarines and protect Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal in the Barents Sea.
The investigation was based on data on companies in recent years obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Journalists from Le Monde, L'Espresso, ICIJ, Kyodo, NRK, Pointer, SVT, The Times, Washington Post, NDR, WDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung took part in the investigation.
Russia is suspected of using the sunken ferry Estonia to spy for NATO
It is believed that the same Russian underwater reconnaissance unit, which is suspected of using the Cypriot network, is now operating in the Baltic Sea, including at the site of the Estonia ferry disaster. NATO intelligence suggests Russia placed navigational instruments and sensors at the site of the 1994 disaster to spy on the alliance's warships and submarines.
The SS Estonia sank in a storm on September 28, 1994, en route from Tallinn to Stockholm, killing 852 people in Europe's worst post-war maritime disaster. The wreckage lies about 35 kilometers southeast of the Finnish island of Utö at a depth of about 80 meters and is officially recognized as a burial site. In 1995, Sweden, Estonia and Finland signed an agreement prohibiting diving in the area of the wreck.
According to the report, several NATO member states have information that technical devices have been placed at the crash site in recent years to provide high-precision navigation for underwater drones and robots, the investigation says. Western security sources told German media they believed Russian military units were conducting exercises there.
There are also suggestions that Russia is using the exclusion zone to hide military sensors that record the so-called signatures of NATO warships and submarines - the characteristic sounds of their propellers and other characteristics.
Many military officials said the crash site's location between Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states was ideal for covert collection of such information due to shipping routes. Russia can operate without interference thanks to an official dive ban, and equipment installed at the wreck site is less visible than on the sandy bottom of the Baltic Sea and can be securely secured.
Estonia and Finland confirmed monitoring of Russian actions
The Estonian Foreign Ministry said it is closely monitoring developments in the Baltic Sea together with its allies, noting that Russia has become more aggressive since the start of the war against Ukraine. The Finnish Border Guard said it does not publish details of possible surveillance measures for operational reasons.
Finland has a full understanding of Russian intelligence activities on its territory, the department added. In the period from 2021 to 2024, the special protection regime for the sunken ship was suspended to investigate new evidence of the death of the Estonia.
The secret division of GUGI (General Directorate of Deep-Sea Research) conducts operations around the world
Russia's Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research, known by its Russian acronym GUGI, is responsible for underwater exploration. This secret unit has existed since the 1960s and reports directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, not the Navy.
GUGI's missions include underwater espionage and sabotage, such as surveying critical infrastructure such as undersea cables and pipelines. The unit operates a fleet of vessels, officially classified as scientific research vessels, equipped with mini-submarines, diving robots, powerful sonar and scanners.
The fleet includes the Yantar, which has frequently appeared over underwater infrastructure in the North and Baltic Seas in recent years. NATO considers it one of Russia's most important reconnaissance ships.
The GUGI system records specific sounds from enemy ships, particularly submarines, by covertly placing sensor systems such as hydrophones in areas where ships are expected to be present. NATO believes that Russia is using not only supposed research vessels such as the Yantar to deploy such spy technology, but also submarines, civilian vessels such as fishing vessels or cargo ships, and increasingly, unmanned underwater drones.
Western technologies create the Harmony surveillance system
The Harmony system is a widely developed underwater warning system in Russian waters. Western security sources told German media they believed Russia had installed similar, although less comprehensive, surveillance systems in other parts of the world's oceans, possibly including the wreck of the USS Estonia.
Security sources told NDR, WDR and SZ that underwater sensors were discovered in the Baltic Sea many years ago. There is reason to believe that not only individual devices, but also entire systems with sensors and control points were installed in the Baltic and Barents Seas.
Sensors found in several countries
In early 2024, Lithuania officially announced the discovery of a Russian-style hydroacoustic sonar on the Curonian Spit and published a photograph of an apparently inoperative device. Lithuanian reports stated that similar finds had been found in Lithuania, Great Britain and Ireland in previous years. The investigation showed that Latvia also made a similar discovery.
Only the Irish military responded to queries, saying it does not comment on ongoing naval operations for operational reasons. The British newspaper Sunday Times reported several months ago about the alleged discovery of Russian spy sensors off the coast of Great Britain, citing security sources.
Experts told German media that they believe such sensors are installed in German waters and may have already been discovered. A German defense ministry spokesman said only in general terms that Germany monitors underwater activities “potentially directed against critical maritime infrastructure or serving espionage purposes.” Detailed responses were declined because they would “allow us to draw conclusions about our underwater intelligence, location and detection capabilities,” the spokesman added.
Cyprus as a "surveillance technology hub"
The latest revelations confirm Cyprus' role as the European hub of the global CCTV technology industry.
In 2022, a committee of the European Parliament (PEGA) accused Cyprus of being “an important European export hub for the CCTV industry.” MEP Sophie in 't Veld said that "on paper there is a strong legal framework governing this issue, including EU rules, but in practice Cyprus is an attractive location for companies selling CCTV technology."
The PEGA Committee concluded that “in practice the rules appear to be easy to circumvent and there is a close link between politics, security services and the CCTV industry. It appears that lax enforcement of regulations is what makes Cyprus such an attractive destination for spyware trading.”
In May 2023, the European Parliament called on Cyprus to “carefully evaluate all export licenses issued for spyware and revoke them where appropriate” after a PEGA investigation found “there were likely to be irregularities and maladministration in the application of Union law in Cyprus.”
NSO Group and Pegasus spyware
Israeli spyware company NSO Group, which develops Pegasus spyware, said in a June 2021 report that its products are “carefully monitored by export control authorities in the countries from which we export our products: Israel, Bulgaria and Cyprus.”
NSO Group "acquired export licenses in Cyprus and Bulgaria and established subsidiaries in two EU countries to sell its products." Pegasus spyware, developed by the NSO group, "was implicated in the attack and murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018."
However, the Cypriot government told the PEGA committee that “NSO Group does not appear to be a registered legal entity in Cyprus and does not hold shares in any legal entities registered in Cyprus,” although it acknowledged the presence of six Cypriot companies established or acquired by members of the NSO board of directors.
WiSpear "spy van" scandal
In 2019, Cyprus faced international scrutiny when police seized a $9 million “spy van” belonging to WiSpear, a company registered in Cyprus and run by former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian. The van was equipped with equipment that allowed it to track electronic devices within a radius of 500 meters, hack any phone and listen to conversations regardless of encryption.
In November 2021, the Cyprus Personal Data Commissioner fined WiSpear €925,000 for violations, finding that the company's activities "resulted in the collection of MAC address and IMSI data from various mobile phones as part of tests and presentations that it conducted without the knowledge of users."
The PEGA committee noted “a possible connection between the Spy Van case and Greece,” as the company that created the surveillance software used in Greece “was founded by former Israeli spy Tal Dilian, the main suspect in the Cypriot Black Van case.”
The PEGA report also states that “Cyprus is also of significant strategic interest to Russia, Turkey and the United States. Moreover, close relations with Israel appear to bring particular mutual benefits in matters of spyware trade. Export licenses for spyware have become the currency of diplomatic relations.”
Source: in-cyprus.philenews.com
