In a very important development, the Chevron-Hellenic Energy consortium has been selected as the preferred investor for 4 blocks south of Crete. This selection opens a new chapter in hydrocarbon exploration and carries significant geopolitical weight for Greece, the wider region, relations with Turkey, and US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Significance for Greece and the Mediterranean Energy Chessboard
The formal award of Chevron’s 4 domestic offshore fields is a very important development, opening hydrocarbon exploration in a very promising area, which has also attracted ExxonMobil to Greece. Beyond a clear ‘vote of confidence’ in the Greek fields, the arrival of the American giant at a critical geopolitical juncture brings significant benefits. It has major geopolitical dimensions, as it aligns with wider US energy interests in the region and serves as a bulwark against Turkey’s attempts to impose itself as a hegemon demanding a leading role in all energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Enhanced Geopolitical Power from Dual US Presence
Chevron and ExxonMobil came to the region fully aware of Turkey’s totally unjustifiable demands regarding the exploitation of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Their presence explicitly confirms that they do not accept this and instead recognize Greece’s right to develop assets in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by internationally recognised law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
It is noteworthy that, in addition to Chevron, in 2019 Greece awarded ExxonMobil exploration licenses for the ‘West’ and ‘Southwest of Crete’ sea blocks. This simultaneous dual presence of two Big Oil companies originating from the USA in the increasingly complex game being played in the Eastern Mediterranean is expected to significantly enhance the country’s geopolitical power and its new energy role in the region.
Greece’s position and rights in its EEZ are certainly strengthened by the presence of the two American super-giants. The experience in the EEZ of Cyprus shows that Turkey refrains from interfering in areas where the two companies operate.
This, in turn, strengthens Greece’s position in its efforts to resolve maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean based on internationally-recognized law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Greece as a Core US Strategic Energy Hub
The recent high-level visits, such as the American energy czar and head of the White House Energy Sovereignty Council, Doug Bergham, and the upcoming visit of US Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, underscore how dynamically Greece is entering the core of the US strategic energy presence. This is further evidenced by the promotion of the Vertical Gas Corridor (VGC) and the import of US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
The core US strategy for the region is to promote and support the decoupling of Europe from Russian energy imports. Greece and its energy infrastructure are a key element of this strategy, especially given the very closely related political and defense interests between the two nations. The US is determined to create an energy corridor linking all the countries in the region.
Greece provides the US with the infrastructure to achieve this goal, from the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) to the VGC, which is designed to transport LNG from Greece north to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
The VGC aims to establish a corridor for LNG that originates in Greece, leveraging the new Alexandroupolis FSRU to receive non-Russian LNG, primarily from the United States.
From Greece, the gas flows northward through interconnectors like the IGB (Greece-Bulgaria) Pipeline and the repurposed Trans-Balkan Pipeline in reverse-flow mode, crossing Bulgaria and Romania. Its final destinations include Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Ukraine, where the gas can utilize Ukraine’s large underground storage facilities, ensuring regional supply resilience.
The VGC is intended to achieve a significant transport capacity of up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Beyond current needs, the infrastructure is being future-proofed as a hydrogen-ready backbone, making it vital for the region’s transition to a low-carbon energy system and establishing a Southeast Hydrogen Corridor. Supported by both the US and the EU’s CESEC framework, the VGC is a key geopolitical tool, enhancing energy security and strategic importance of its participating nations.
These were the subject of the sixth meeting of the ‘Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation’ (P-TEC) gathering of public and private industry leaders, held between November 6-7, 2025, in Athens. P-TEC provided a platform for energy ministers and delegations from Central and Eastern Europe to work cooperatively with the US Department of Energy and other US agencies, and the private sector, to address energy issues in Central and Eastern Europe. It discussed energy security and affordability, infrastructure projects, and investment opportunities.
Intense hydrocarbon activity is also being seen in other Eastern Mediterranean countries, including Crete, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. While it may be tempting to believe that these developments create a new strong pole that offsets Turkey’s aggressive demands, they are not sufficient to resolve the issues, especially without the direct involvement of the US and the EU. Pressure alone is not enough.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ call for a 5×5 meeting with the participation of Turkey to address maritime zone issues is a step in the right direction. Crucially, the position that both Greece and Cyprus secured at the October European Council meeting—that a country (Turkey) which disputes the sovereignty of the Aegean islands, threatens Greece with a casus-belli, continues to occupy a third of Cyprus, and intervenes to frustrate projects such as the GSI interconnection, does not qualify for SAFE membership—is a significant achievement.
The hope is that these developments will prompt Turkey to respond positively to Mitsotakis’ invitation for the 5×5 meeting and start a positive dialogue to resolve these problems, especially now that the US seems ready and willing to join this process.
Charles Ellinas is Councilor of the Atlantic Council. The article is republished from the blog of the Cyprus Economic Society.
